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The relation between terrorism and high population growth 
 
By Mario COCCIAa† 
 
Abstract. A fundamental problem in socioeconomic sciences is how to explain the root 
causes of terrorism. The literature has analyzed several determinants of terrorism. However, 
the precise role of demographic factors for the origin and evolution of terrorism in specific 
geoeconomic areas is hardly known. Results here show that high population growth seems 
to be basic for the source and evolution of terrorism. This study found that terrorism 
thrives, in average, in specific cultural zones with high growth rates of population 
combined with collective identity factors and low socioeconomic development. Overall, 
then, the main aim of this study is to clarify and generalize whenever possible, the 
demographic source of the terrorism and suggest appropriate socioeconomic policies to 
preempt this critical problem in society over the long run. 
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1. Introduction 
his essay has two goals. The first is to show that one of root causes of 
terrorism is the high growth rate of population. The second is to stress the 
importance of appropriate policies of growth that ameliorate socioeconomic 
conditions of population and indirectly reduce terrorism. These topics are basic 
because terrorist activity is growing worldwide in the last decades with several 
incidents in the USA, European countries and other rich and/or developing nations 
and it is essential to understand why this is happening in order to defuse the 
underlying principal causes (Editorials Nature, 2015; Reardon, 2015; Norris et al., 
2013; Rosendorff & Sandler, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004). In particular, Americans 
have been targeted in about 25 per cent of the terrorist incidents during the past 20 
years (Linstone, 2003; cf. Park & Bali, 2015). Devezas & Santos (2006) argue, by 
fitting over 10,000 terrorist incidents since 1961 to a logistic growth curve, that the 
current period is only at the very low stage of development of international 
terrorism and that an inflection point will be reached at 2030s or thereabout. 
Several studies in literature endeavour to clarify the direct and indirect factors of 
terrorism (Newman, 2006; Abadie, 2005; Crenshaw, 1981), although predictors of 
terrorism are often unclear factors (Krueger & Malečková, 2009). Some sources of 
terrorism are explained with economic factors (Enders et al., 2016), political 
factors (Coggins, 2015), social factors (Schaafsma & Williams, 2012), etc. 
However, how demographic factors in certain environments cause and sustain 
terrorism are hardly known. This study endeavors to explain some research 
questions: What demographic and socio-economic factors have originated 
terrorism in specific geoeconomic areas? And Why? The underlying problem of 
these research questions is to explain the root causes of the terrorism in society. 
The study here confronts this scientific problem trying to explain whenever 
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possible, the source and development of terrorism in the geoeconomic regions 
considering critical demographic factors. Findings can clarify one of contributing 
factors of the origin and evolution of the terrorism in certain problematic 
environments. In addition, the results here can also support fruitful insights for a 
policy of resolution directed to reduce demographic and socioeconomic problems 
that lead to terrorism in selected geocultural zones over the long run. In order to 
position this analysis in the field of terrorist studies, next section begins by briefly 
reviewing the literature and then developing the theoretical framework of this 
contribution.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Crenshaw (1981) argues that terrorism was coined to describe the systematic 
inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population: 
‚Terrorism is an attractive strategy to groups of different ideological persuasions 
who challenge a nation's authority. …to dramatize a cause… to gain popular 
support, to provoke regime violence, to inspire followers‛ (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 
389). Ackoff & Rovin (2003) claim that terrorism, ‚a special type of 
fundamentalism‛, is ‚violence against innocent‛ and ‚is a response to an 
environment that is undergoing an accelerating rate of change and rapidly 
increasing complexity‛. Terrorism can be described by four characteristics: 
violence, non-combatant targets, a desire for power, and the need to attract 
attention, send a message, or provoke an extreme response (Linstone, 2003). 
Coates (1996) claims that a terrorist threat exists when, there must be an issue, 
there must be some group organized and with a purpose related to that issue and 
the terrorist group must have the technical skills to carry out a terrorist action for a 
political purpose. Linstone (2007) argues of a current wave of terrorism, from 
1970s to 2020s, based on ‚religious‛– and claims that terrorism is a form of 
warfare that violates the conventions of conduct developed in wars between states, 
where warfare is conducted between uniformed armed forces only and people stay 
out of the way except for providing money and manpower (cf. Rapoport, 2004; 
Ball, 2005; Schuurman & Horgan, 2016; Desouza et al., 2007).  
Crenshaw (1981) also suggests that an appropriate theoretical framework to 
analyse the settings of terrorism should separate between preconditions (factors 
that set the stage for terrorism over the long run) and precipitants (specific events 
that precede the occurrence of terrorism). Some preconditions of terrorism are 
economic factors such as low income, poverty, inequality, etc. (Newman, 2006; 
Ezcurra & Palacios, 2016; Coccia, 2017e). Ackoff & Rovin (2003) argue that the 
‚countries that are the breeding grounds for terrorists are the least advanced 
economically‛. Moreover, Enders et al., (2016) observe that domestic and 
transnational terrorist attacks are more concentrated in middle-income 
countries/areas and the point of concentration is shifted to lower income countries 
after the rising influence of the religious fundamentalist. Some studies show that 
poverty and large numbers of young men facing dim economic prospects, also are 
likely contributors to terrorism (Ehrlich & Liu, 2002). Other studies of terrorism 
analyse the political factors, such as government repression, human rights 
violation, state failure, etc. (Coggins, 2015; Abadie, 2005; Krieger & Meierrieks, 
2011). Causes of terrorism are also due to social factors, such as low levels of 
education and of human development, etc. (van Berger et al., 2015; Burgoon, 
2006). Schaafsma & Williams (2012) argue that social exclusion and rejection 
among ethnic minority and majority members lead to increased intergroup hostility 
and stronger fundamentalist religious beliefs. Choma et al., (2016) posit that: 
‚religious fundamentalism, or the belief that there is one true religious teaching to 
abide by, is associated with intolerance toward outgroups‛, whereas Schuurman & 
Horgan (2016, p. 90) claim that: ‚ ‘radicalization’ … is … a cognitive process, i.e., 
… the adoption of increasingly radical and extremist convictions … leading up to 
involvement in terrorism‛.  In general, the religious fundamentalism has the 
capacity to disrupt the stability of societies/communities and to generate violence 
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and terrorism (Butler, 2015). Although several studies about the causes of 
terrorism, current theoretical frameworks are not comprehensive approaches 
because it is clear that there are at least some factors about terrorism that the 
current literature has trouble explaining. Next section presents the theoretical 
framework of this study that endeavors to investigate and explain, whenever 
possible how the interplay between demographic and socioeconomic factors of 
specific geoeconomic areas can influence the evolution of terrorism over the long 
run.  
 
3. Theoretical grounding and working hypothesis  
Piazza (2006) argues that a popular hypothesis is that terrorism and other forms 
of political violence are due to poverty and poor distribution of economic 
resources. The UN General Assembly also claimed that the crisis of international 
terrorism can be due to the issues of poverty, inequality, underdevelopment and the 
absence of social justice in the developing world (United Nations, 2016; Coccia, 
2017e). This general ‚rooted-in-poverty hypothesis‛ explains the terrorism as 
‚expression of socioeconomic discontent and desperation‛ (Piazza, 2006). In fact, 
terrorist organizations can use poor socioeconomic conditions of geoeconomic 
areas as a base to support their criminal activities (cf., Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010; 
Enders & Hoover, 2012). Moreover, low levels of economic and social 
development increase the appeal of political extremism and encourage political 
violence and instability in society (Piazza, 2006). Many studies confirm that low 
income and high inequality are conducive to violent crime (Christens & Speer, 
2005; Cahill & Mulligan, 2003; cf., Muller & Seligson 1987, 1990; Blomberg et 
al., 2004a, 2004b; Coccia, 2017e). However, Piazza (2006) analyses this 
hypothesis that poverty, inequality, and poor economic development are root 
causes of terrorism and shows that unlike popular opinion, ‚no significant 
relationship between any of the measures of economic development and terrorism 
can be determined. Rather, variables such as population, ethno-religious diversity, 
increased state repression and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are 
found to be significant predictors of terrorism‛. The study of these variables, such 
as demographic factors, is critical for understanding the relation between different 
socioeconomic environments and terrorist activity (Parsons, 1991). In general, 
scholars show that the high population density and population growth can lead to 
resource scarcity and violence (Christens & Speer, 2005; Lee, 2016; cf., Christian, 
1961). The theoretical background of these studies is the theory of Malthus 
(1817[1798]) presented in the book An Essay on the Principle of Population where 
T. R. Malthus wrote that the population has geometric growth rates, while the food 
resources have arithmetic (lower) growth rates. This disproportionate growth rate 
between population and subsistence food decreases natural resources and space for 
people and creates a looming crisis and environmental conflicts. Malthus 
(1817[1798]) was the first scholar to analyse the socioeconomic problems of high 
growth rates of population that generate scarcity of resources and are a ‚future 
cause of strife‛ (Lee, 2016). Several scholars are current proponents of neo-
Malthusian approaches in different research fields to explain economic phenomena 
and social issues, such as Ehrlich (1968) that foretold a coming crisis from 
overpopulation and limited resources (Meadows et al., 2004; cf., Coccia, 2005, 
2007, 2009d, 2012d, 2014c, 2017a). Kaplan (2000) argued a possible threat to the 
developed world due to population increase of poor countries that, as a 
consequence, may increase the violence. This research stream supports the thesis 
that high growth rates of population, combined with scarce environmental 
resources, can lead to conflicts and violence. Lee (2016) claims that: ‚Overt 
violence is site-specific with ties to local relationships and histories, but the larger 
process of material transformation and power relations plays a crucial role‛. 
Visaria (1989) argues that one of the most serious consequences of the acceleration 
in population growth is the difficulty of generating adequate employment 
opportunities for the growing labor force (cf., Keyfitz, 1993). Cassils (2004) argues 
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that the poorest geoeconomic regions of the world, where population growth is still 
rapid, will continue to suffer with a decreased life expectancy because of resource 
depletion, conflicts, and diseases. Abernethy (1993) confirmed these results adding 
that: ‚rapid population growth causes poverty.... fundamentalism and hate may 
become more likely when people's expected standard of living is slipping away, 
beyond control… religious fundamentalism and violence appear together ... to 
thrive alongside the spread of poverty and unemployment‛. Lemsine (1992), for 
instance, argued that in Algeria, the inequality between rich and poor is rapidly 
increasing, and religious fundamentalism as well. In short, the mismanagement of 
this equilibrium population-natural and economic resources in specific regions can 
cause problems of violence that revolve around issues of power rather than around 
issues of absolute scarcity of resources (Peluso & Watts, 2001). In fact, 
overpopulation, socioeconomic growth and security have several interconnections 
and overpopulation can be a main factor of growing insecurity worldwide (Cassils, 
2004). Linstone (2003, p. 288, original emphasis) argued that: ‚The world 
population is expected to increase from 6.2 billion to 9.3 billion in 2050 and 98% 
of this growth will be in the poorer countries. ….The billions of frustrated and 
angry individuals will constitute a vast pool of potential ‘true believers’ eager to 
find release in terrorism‛. Ehrlich & Liu (2002) also observed that:  
high population growth rates are expected to continue in many developing 
nations, with a projected annual growth rate for people aged 20–34 of 2.82% 
as opposed to a rate of 0.16% in developed countries during the years 2000–
2050 … In the face of such growth, job opportunities may be doomed to 
become much rarer. And large numbers of unemployed, disaffected young 
men, who see the West as their enemy, provide the cannon fodder for 
terrorism. 
Moreover, Krieger & Meierrieks (2010) claimed that terrorism as a random 
event is more likely in a larger country: ‚Terrorism is also positively linked to 
larger populations, but this may simply indicate that terrorism is more likely in 
more populous countries‛. In general, population growth in specific geoeconomic 
zones may contribute to support deteriorated human behaviour in society and, as a 
consequence, violent crime and terrorism (cf., Curtis, 1975; Altman, 1978). Animal 
studies also show that a high number of subjects in a limited space may generate 
environments aversive and related deteriorated behaviour (Hebb, 1958 as quoted 
by Cassils, 2004). In addition, people from countries with poverty, overpopulation 
and on-going conflicts tend to migrate towards more prosperous areas alike of the 
current human flow from the Middle East and Africa to Western Europe (White, 
2016). This mass migration is a phenomenon closely associated with the expansion 
of human population from poor to rich geographical areas and is a characteristic of 
the history of humanity that if food becomes scarce in one region, population 
migrates towards regions of greater abundance (cf., hunter-gatherer approach, see 
Bowles, 2009). The mass migration, because of high population in specific 
geoeconomic regions, can also generate socioeconomic and security problems 
throughout wide areas of the globe.  
Hence, population growth contributes to congestion the overexploitation of 
resources and space, thereby reducing the freedoms of individuals. The forecasted 
high growth rates of population, mainly in poor and unstable geoeconomic regions, 
can increase socioeconomic problems and possibly give rise to more violence and 
terrorism (Cassils, 2004). 
Although many studies about socioeconomic causes of terrorism, how 
population growth influences the emergence of terrorism is hardly known. In fact, 
among the literature of terrorism, convincing arguments that explain the 
relationship between demographic factor and terrorism are scarce. In particular, 
many studies do not explain the precise effect of population growth on terrorism, 
and a number of important factors linked to terrorism and population in specific 
environments has been largely ignored, such as age composition of population, 
religious fractionalization, political stability of countries, etc. The study here has 
the goal of clarifying, as far as possible, how demographic factors can support the 
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source and evolution of terrorism over the long run. This theoretical framework 
discussed above suggests a main relation between population growth, 
environmental aversion and terrorism that can lay the theoretical foundations to 
posit and explore the following hypothesis of terrorism driven by population 
growth. This hypothesis can clarify the problem of the root causes of terrorism 
underlying the research questions stated in the introduction of the paper.  
Suppose that:  
a) Middle East is a cultural zone with high population growth 
b) Terrorism is a specific and distinct type of violent crime 
The hypothesis, based on these assumptions, is as follows:  
Hypothesis of terrorism driven by population growth: 
High growth rates of population, in certain environments, cause and sustain the 
source and evolution of terrorism, ceteris paribus. 
Figure 1 shows the model of this study, underlying the hypothesis, of how the 
high population growth can influence the terroristic activity. Specifically, the high 
growth rates of population, combined with socioeconomic stressors of specific 
areas (1st round rectangle at left in fig. 1), generate aversive environments and 
cultural deviance (central dashed rectangle), and terrorism as a result (small 
rectangle at right in fig. 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Model from problematic socio-demographic factors to terrorism in selected 
geoeconomic areas. Note: The high growth rate of population can also explain the source of 
terrorism in some areas of countries with an enclave of immigrants, environmental 
aversion, connectedness to mainstream society and collective identity factors. 
 
The purpose of the present study is to see whether statistical evidence supports 
the hypothesis that the source and evolution of terrorism in specific geoeconomic 
areas can be explained by the high level of population growth over time. The 
research design to substantiate the hypothesis is described in the next section.  
 
4. Methods 
Figure 1 shows the basic elements and connections of the model, underlying the 
hypothesis stated above, that will be validated with statistical evidence. The 
variables under study are in table 1. Sources of data are Democracy Cross-National 
Data by Norris (2015), World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2008) and 
Global Terrorism Database (START, 2015). In particular, the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist 
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events and incidents around the world (more than 140,000 cases) from 1970 to 
2014. This study divides the countries in three cultural zones considering some 
Regional categories of the dataset by Norris (2015): North America, Western 
Europe, and Middle East. This classification is used to analyse demographic and 
socioeconomic factors of these selected geoeconomic areas. The dataset by Norris 
(2015) does not include terrorist data and this study uses the Global Terrorism 
Database (START, 2015) to analyse the data of terrorist attacks, the number of total 
fatalities and non-fatal injuries for incidents across similar geoeconomic regions for 
creating a comparable framework of investigation: i.e., North America, Western 
Europe, Middle East & North Africa (Appendix A shows the sample of countries). 
The preliminary statistical analysis is performed with descriptive statistics and bar 
graphs that represent arithmetic mean (or number of cases) of variables under study 
on y-axis and the geocultural zones above mentioned on x-axis. The main statistical 
analysis of this study compares the arithmetic means of some variables (i.e., annual 
population growth rates 1975-2002 / 2002-2015 and total number of fatalities for 
terrorist incidents from 2002 to 2014) between selected cultural zones. In 
particular, the Independent Samples T Test (a parametric test) compares the 
arithmetic mean of variables just mentioned between two independent cultural 
zones (Middle East vs. North America or Western Europe) in order to determine 
whether there is statistical evidence that these arithmetic means are significantly 
different.  
 
Table 1. Variables, description and their sources  
Demographic indicators (United Nations Development Programme data, cf., Norris, 2015):  
- Annual population growth rate 1975-2002 and 2002-2015 
- Total fertility rate per woman 1970-1975 and 2000-2005 
- Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 2006 (World Bank, 2008) 
Economic indicator (World Bank, 2008): 
- Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 2006 international $  
- Income Gini coefficient 2002y: Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or 
households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value 
of 100 absolute inequality. 
Sociopolitical indicators: 
- Human Development Index –HDI– (years 1990 
and 2005) based on United Nations Development 
Programme data (cf., Norris, 2015) 
 The HDI is a composite index that measures the 
average achievement of human development: a long and 
healthy life (life expectancy at birth), the education 
(mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years) 
and the standard of living dimension based on gross 
national income per capita (UNDP, 2016). 
- Freedom House Index of democratization 
standardized 2000 (Norris, 2015) 
 It assigns ratings of political rights and civil 
liberties for each independent nation (electoral process, 
political pluralism and participation, and government 
functioning). 
- Religious fractionalization 2002 based on 
Alesina et al. (2003) data (cf., Norris, 2015) 
 This index defined by Alesina et al., (2003) uses the 
term ‚fractionalization‛ to represent the religious 
plurality of countries. Alesina et al., (2003, pp. 158ff) 
compute the fractionalization as one minus Herfindahl 
index of religious group shares, and find that two 
randomly selected individuals from a population belong 
to different groups. The formula is: 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑗 = 1−
 𝑠𝑖𝑗
2𝑁
𝑖=1   where sij is the share of group i (i =1…N) in 
country j. It indicates a measure of fragmentation 
(heterogeneity) based on a broader classification of 
religious groups. 
- Predominant religion across countries based on 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Data (cf., Norris, 
2015)  
 Predominant religion is computed by the number 
of current adherents based on a combination of census 
reports and population surveys that consider historically 
predominant religious cultures, those who actively 
‘practice’ a particular religion, etc. 
- Kaufmann political stability 2006 (cf., Norris, 
2015) 
 It measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism.  
Indicators of terrorist incidents for 2002-2014 period (Global Terrorism Database, START, 2015): 
- Number of total confirmed fatalities for the incident. This number includes all victims and attackers who 
died as a direct result of the incident  
- Number of confirmed non-fatal injuries to both perpetrators and victims 
- Number of terrorist incidents  
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The null hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1) of the Independent 
Samples T test are given by: 
H0: µ1 = µ2 (i.e., the arithmetic mean of the variable in the Middle East is equal 
to the arithmetic mean of the variable in North America or Western Europe) 
H1: µ1  µ2 (i.e., the arithmetic mean of the variable in the Middle East is NOT 
equal to the arithmetic mean of the variable in North America or Western Europe) 
The expectation is to reject the H0 in order to support the hypothesisstated above 
that the source of terrorism can be also explained by high growth rates of 
population. Statistical analyses are performed by using the Statistics Software 
SPSS version 15.0. 
 
5. Results  
Understanding where terrorism happens can provide vital information to 
explaining why it happens. In particular, terrorism cannot be understood without 
having accurate knowledge of the environmental determinants (e.g., demographic, 
economic, geographic and social factors of areas) in which it occurs. First of all, 
terrorism here is considered a specific type of crime that leads to violence in 
society (Rice, 2009); a proxy of this violent crime is represented by number of 
fatalities and non-fatal injuries for incidents of terrorist attacks. Figure 1 and 2 
show that Middle East has the highest number of confirmed fatalities and non-fatal 
injuries for terrorist incidents over 2002-2014 (Global Terrorism Database, 
START, 2015; cf. Haushofer et al., 2010).  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of confirmed fatalities and non-fatal injuries for terrorist incidents across 
selected cultural zones over 2002-2014. Source: Global Terrorism Database (START, 
2015). 
 
Figure 2. Number of terrorist incidents with fatalities and non-fatal injuries across selected 
geoeconomic zones over 2002-2014. Source: Global Terrorism Database (START, 2015). 
The following statistical analyses may clarify the manifold demographic and 
socioeconomic factors behind the terrorism, whereas the discussion may explain 
the linkages of how specific geoeconomic factors cause and sustain terrorism over 
time.  
 
5.1. Demographic dynamics and structure of population 
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Figure 3 shows the annual population growth rate in 1975-2002 and in 2002-
2015 period considering three macro-regions: North America, Western Europe and 
Middle East. The cultural zones of Western countries had an average annual 
population growth rate of about 1.13% over 1975-2002 (1.37% in North America 
and 0.89% in Western Europe, respectively) vs. Middle East that had 3.1% (i.e., 
+274% higher!). The period 2002-2015 confirms that Western countries had a low 
average annual population growth rate of about 0.76 per cent vs. Middle East with 
1.98 per cent (+260 per cent higher!). Figure 4 supports the previous results 
considering the total fertility rate per woman over 1970-1975 and 2000-2005. The 
time lag of about 30 years represents the transition of one generation of people. In 
particular, from 1970 to 1975, data show that Western cultural zones had an 
average total fertility rate of about 3.4 per cent vs. Middle East cultural zone that 
had 6.2 per cent (+182 per cent higher), whereas over 2000-2005 the proportion is 
of about 1.94% vs. 3.14%, respectively (i.e., +161 per cent higher in the Middle 
East cultural zone). Fargues (2000) showed that total fertility rate in Israel is under 
3, while that of Palestinians in the Gaza strip is over 7. The effect of this trend on 
population ages 0-14 (per cent of total) is that Western Europe in 2006 had 16.66 
per cent of young people (% of total), North America had 22.75 per cent, whereas 
Middle East had the highest value, 30.33 per cent of total. These results indicate a 
wide population structure of young in the geoeconomic region of the Middle East.  
 
 
Figure 3. Population growth rate from 1975 to 2015 per cultural zones 
 
 
Figure 4. Total fertility rate per cultural zones 
 
5.2. Socioeconomic factors 
The socioeconomic factors of the geoeconomic areas under study are as follows. 
Freedom house index of democratization (2000) and Human Development Index –
HDI- (in 1975 and 2005, i.e. after a generation of people) of the Middle East is 
lower than Western cultural zones (Table 2). In short, the Middle East area has 
high growth rates of population in a social environment with low democratization 
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and HDI that induce weak institutions, rules of law and economic governance. 
These problematic socioeconomic factors can negatively affect the patterns of 
economic growth over time. In fact, Table 2 shows that GDP per capita PPP 2006y 
of the Middle East was $2,748, whereas the average value in Western cultural 
zones was about $24,543 (+893% higher!). In addition, results also show that the 
Middle East has a high inequality distribution of the income among individuals 
(about 40 with a low standard deviation) and very low political stability (negative 
value 0.64) in comparison to Western geoeconomic zone (see, Tab. 2). Finally, 
the analysis of the predominant religion in the Middle East, with a dummy variable 
(0= not predominant; 1=predominant), shows that this geoeconomic and cultural 
zone has, of course, a predominant of Islam. An indicator connected to 
predominant religion is the religious fractionalization. Alesina et al. (2003, pp. 158, 
173, 175) argue that: ‚religious fractionalization tends to be higher in more tolerant 
and free societies‛, and ‚The index of religious fractionalization bears a 
relationship to controlling corruption, preventing bureaucratic delays, tax 
compliance, transfers, infrastructure quality, lower illiteracy, school attainment, 
democracy, and political rights observed religious fragmentation is larger in more 
tolerant countries‛. The Middle East has also low religious fractionalization (i.e., 
0.26). These problematic factors can set the stage for terrorism over the long run. 
In fact, Ackoff & Rovin (2003) claim that inequality of the distribution of wealth, 
low opportunities for development and quality of life contribute to ‚the frustration 
and alienation that give rise to terrorism‛ (cf., Coccia, 2017e). A study for the 
Heritage Foundation in 2002 also argues that countries prone to terrorism are the 
least advantaged economically (Ackoff & Rovin, 2003, p. 146). To sum up, this 
statistical evidence seems to show that a high annual average of population growth 
(and a population structure of young) combined with problematic socioeconomic 
factors, especially poverty, low democratization, HDI and political stability may be 
critical contribution factor of terrorism (cf. Enrlich & Liu, 2002).  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of some indicators across geoeconomic and cultural zones 
 North America Western Europe Middle East 
Freedom House Stand. scale 100pts 2000y(1) 92.82 (12.37) 96.58 (4.37) 34.57 (18.48) 
Human Development Index(1) (HDI) 1975y 0.80 (0.10) 0.81 (0.05) 0.58 (0.13) 
Human Development Index(1) (HDI) 2005y 0.91 (0.07) 0.94 (0.02) 0.78 (0.10) 
GDP per capita PPP in U$ 2006y(2) $23,371 ($16,001.86) $25,715 ($11,104.06) $2,748 ($2.004.13) 
Gini coefficient 2002y(1) 41.80 (10.84) 31.58 (2.91) 39.44 (2.26) 
Kaufmann political stability(1) 2006y 0.28 (0.67) 0.89 (0.40) 0.64 (1.02) 
Religious fractionalization (1) 2002y 0.57 (0.34) 0.35 (0.20) 0.26 (0.24) 
Predominant Islam(1) * 0 0 1 
Source (1): Norris (2015); (2): World Bank (2008). Note: First number below the geoeconomic areas 
is the arithmetic mean; Standard Deviation (SD) is in round parenthesis. *Dummy: 1=predominant; 
0=not predominant. 
 
5.3. Comparison of arithmetic mean across cultural zones  
Tables 2-3 show basic information (arithmetic mean and SD) about the 
geoeconomic areas under study. In general, Middle East has an arithmetic mean of 
annual population growth rate and number of fatalities from terrorist attacks higher 
than other geocultural zones (Figs 1-2 and Tab. 3). The statistical analysis of 
Independent Samples Test shows that the arithmetic mean of the annual population 
growth rate (1975-2002 and 2002-2014 period) for the Middle East vs. other 
geocultural zones is significantly different (the t-test for Equality of Means in Tab. 
3 hasa p<0.05). The output of the t-test for Equality of Means, considering the 
variable of average number of fatalities from terrorist attacks, hasp< 0.01, and then 
the statistical analysis here concludes that the average number of Fatalities from 
terrorist attacks of the Middle East vs. other geocultural areas is significantly 
different (see last rows of the Tab. 3). Overall then, the statistical evidence here 
seems in general to show the systematic differences of arithmetic mean between 
geoeconomic areas, and in particular, a significant high growth rates of population 
and number of fatalities for terrorism incidents in the Middle East in comparison to 
Western Europe and North America. These significant differences can be due to 
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systematic factors described here and summarized for the Middle East in figure 6. 
Overall, then, these results are consistent with the hypothesis stated above about 
the effect of high population growth on the source and evolution of terrorism. 
 
Table 3. Independent Samples Test of the Middle East vs. other cultural zones  
 Levene's Test for Equality of Variances T-test for Equality of Means 
Annual population growth rate 1975-2002     Sig. 
 Mean (SD)  F Sig. t df (2-tailed) 
Middle East 3.1 (1.28) Equal variances assumed 4.38 0.04 6.66 36 0.01 
Western Europe 0.8   (0.8) Equal variances not assumed 6.66 30.06 0.01 
Middle East 3.1 (1.28) Equal variances assumed 1.31 0.27 2.27 20 0.03 
North America 1.4 (0.55) Equal variances not assumed 4.00 6.37 0.01 
Annual population growth rate 2002-2015     Sig. 
 Mean (SD)  F Sig. t df (2-tailed) 
Middle East 1.98 (0.73) Equal variances assumed 0.67 0.42 5.88 32 0.01 
Western Europe 0.55 (0.66) Equal variances not assumed   5.95 31.34 0.01 
Middle East 1.98 (0.73) Equal variances assumed 2.90 0.10 2.34 20 0.03 
North America 0.97 (0.25) Equal variances not assumed   4.57 9.15 0.01 
Total Number of Fatalities from terrorist attacks 2002-2014     Sig. 
 Mean (SD)  F Sig. t df (2-tailed) 
Middle East, NA(a) 2.81 (13.97) Equal variances assumed 83.30 0.00 7.79 25559 0.01 
Western Europe(b) 0.23   (3.07) Equal variances not assumed   22.17 9937.47 0.01 
Middle East, NA(a) 2.81 (13.97) Equal variances assumed 9.404 0.002 2.71 24066 0.01 
North America (c) 0.63   (2.57) Equal variances not assumed   12.58 568.79 0.01 
Note: Standard Deviation (SD) is in round parenthesis; NA is North Africa. (a)= N. 23 766; (b)= N. 
1795; (c)= N. 302. 
 
 
Figure 6. Demographic and socioeconomic factors that set the stage for terrorism over the 
long run, ceteris paribus.Note: HDI=Human Development Index; Economic inequality is 
measured with Gini coefficient 2002y. 
 
6. Discussion  
High growth rates of population as a precondition that sets the stage for 
terrorism over the long run 
The statistical analysis shows that high growth rates of population in the Middle 
East can generate socioeconomic problems in society, but why and how high 
growth rates of population can originate terrorism in the Middle East?  
We now move on to discuss and explain the relation between high growth rates 
of population in the Middle East and source of terrorism, trying, as far as possible, 
to clarify the problems mentioned.  
High growth rates of population as an environmental stressor that induces 
violent crime and terrorism 
Rice (2009) argues that: ‚similarities between terrorism and crime are … 
evident‛, then the socio-psychological research of crimes is well positioned to 
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frame environmental stressors that can support terrorism’s psychological space (cf., 
LaFree & Dugan, 2009). In general, high density of population has often been 
investigated as an environmental stressor since it is predicted to have a significant 
negative influence on social relations and psychological health (Baum & Paulus, 
1991). Large numbers of people may lead to social overload and threaten 
regulation of human interaction (Altman, 1975; Baum & Koman, 1976; Desor, 
1972; Laird, 1973; Baum et al., 1982; Schulz-Gambard et al., 1988; Valins & 
Baum, 1973). Animal studies also demonstrate large negative effects of high 
density in limited space (Christian, 1961; Calhoun, 1962; Thiessen & Rodgers, 
1961). In particular, crime is strongly associated to disorganized and distressed 
areas with high population density, levels of economic deprivation and ethnic 
heterogeneity (cf. Christens & Speer, 2005; Cahill & Mulligan, 2003). Many 
studies indicate that a higher population density and a lower level of household 
income are associated with increased residential crime (Cahill & Mulligan, 2003). 
The positive correlation between higher population density and crime can be 
explained with the theory of association between density and poverty (Curtis, 
1975). Especially, these environmental stressors, because of unfavorable socio-
economic-demographic conditions in built or natural locations, can generate 
cultural deviance, behavioural and psychological health problems (Lepore et al., 
1991; Regoeczi, 2003). Sociological studies also consider the perspective that high 
density of population and crowding produce deteriorated human functioning that 
can lead to crime (Altman, 1978). Studies also reveal that frustration generated by 
high levels of population density will stimulate aggression in individuals 
(Mackintosh, et al., 1975; Regoeczi, 2003). As a matter of fact, frustration seems to 
increase in response to decreasing environmental resources and space due to high 
population density (Altman, 1975; Baldassare, 1979; Verbrugge & Taylor, 1980). 
Hence, high density of population can generate areas with high levels of 
environmental aversion, which are conducive to high rates of crime (Cahill & 
Mulligan, 2003).  
In addition, high growth rates of population modify the demographic structure 
of nations, increasing the younger age categories, which induce a psychological, 
cultural, social and economic change of nations. The age composition of 
populations, combined with poverty and other socio-economic factors, is in general 
a neglected factor for several terroristic studies (cf., Ehrlich & Liu, 2002). The 
nations (or areas) with young population can have high human resources and low 
economic resources (such as capital). These high growth rates of population 
increase the pressure on socioeconomic systems and out-migration of young 
people1. In fact, the increasing young individuals in the Middle East and/or 
enclaves in Western countries, combined with poverty, can be unable to achieve 
valuated goals and this is a source of frustration. This ‚blockage of goal-seeking 
behavior‛ (Agnew, 1985, passim), combined with intergroup hostility and in-group 
identity factors, may lead to radicalization path and fundamentalism of many 
young. These environments that are aversive and painful in specific areas of the 
Middle East can support violence and terrorism as a result (cf. van Bergen et al., 
2015). Ehrlich & Liu (2002, p. 187) argue that the vast majority of terrorists were 
young adult males: ‚Based on the information from the FBI’s most wanted terrorist 
list …approximately 90% of those on the list were all males and from 22 to 34 
years old when their first alleged terrorist act took place‛. Moreover, many 
terrorists today are young, well-educated, and middle class in background also of 
advanced countries (Butler, 2015). These students or young professionals may be 
 
1 These younger age categories in poor nations also support migration flows towards mature nations, 
such as the current trends from Middle East & Africa to Western Europe. This population dynamics 
may generate social problems in host countries in the presence of an enclave of immigrants and 
descents that makes assimilation less likely to occur (cf. Barreira da Silva Rocha, 2013). This factor 
can generate in the long run an import terrorism, such as the enclave of Muslim population in 
suburbs of Brussels that were the headquarters of terrorists responsible of attacks at Paris - 13 
November 2015 -and Brussels - 22 March 2016. 
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disillusioned with the prospects of changing society and see little chance of access 
to the system despite their privileged status (Crenshaw, 1981).  
In general, the prevalence of young population in poor socioeconomic 
environments can induce collective and/or personal deprivation that, in the 
presence of in-group identity factors, is conducive to frustrated, angry and violent 
individuals (cf. van Bergen et al., 2015). This social process can turn to interethnic 
tensions, religious fundamentalism and terroristic activity as a result both in the 
Middle East and in selected areas of Western world (cf. Schaafsma & Williams, 
2012; Choma et al., 2016). In short, high growth rates of population are basic to 
reinforce, in aversive environments with intergroup hostility, the common 
identities (based on similar religious and cultural traditions) and fundamentalist 
drive (cf. van Bergen et al., 2015). Choma et al. (2016) confirm that religious 
identification and intergroup disgust sensitivity may lead to relevant interfaith 
prejudices.  
Hence, high population density and poor socioeconomic conditions of specific 
areas create environmental stressors and aversion that can induce violent crime and 
terrorism (Christens & Speer, 2005; Regoeczi, 2003; Cahill & Mulligan, 2003; 
Rice, 2009; LaFree & Dugan, 2009). In particular, the presence of problematic 
environments and in-group identity factors among people may drag the increasing 
young individuals into a collective/individual deviance and in turn to the terrorism, 
which is a ‚special type of fundamentalism‛ (Ackoff & Rovin, 2003). In fact, the 
aversive environments are the source of social frustration and anger that may 
radicalize cultural tradition of many young individuals and induce to 
violence/terrorism (Rice, 2009). These psychological and social processes of 
cultural deviance, in the Middle East and/or Wester countries with enclaves of 
immigrants and descents, seem to be primarily due to high growth rates of 
population in aversive environments.  
Overall, then, the statistical evidence and discussion of this study seem in 
general to be consistent with the hypothesis that the source of terrorism can be 
explained by the high growth rates of population in the Middle East cultural zone, 
combined with socioeconomic poverty, political instability, economic inequality 
and in-group identity, that generate environmental aversion, frustration and 
violence as a result.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Terrorism and crime are alike (Rice, 2009) and affected by demographic, 
socioeconomic and environmental features of particular locations (Cozens, 2008; 
National Institute of Justice, 1996). The scientific research shows that manifold 
factors affect the terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Enders et al., 2016; Coggins, 2015; 
Schaafsma & Williams, 2012). On the basis of the argument presented in this 
paper, we can therefore conclude that one of principal sources of terrorism and its 
evolution over time is due to high growth rates of population in the Middle East, 
combined with poverty, political instability and in-group identity, ceteris paribus. 
As a matter of fact, the support/defense of religion is an illusory cause of terrorism, 
because religion is not an environmental stressor per se, whereas a basic 
determinant of terrorism may be a critical demographic mass that, in certain 
environments with problematic socioeconomic factors, leads to disrupt the stability 
of societies/communities, frustration, anger, radicalization paths and terrorism as a 
result (cf. Butler, 2015). The findings here can clarify, as far as possible, some 
important features of the origin and evolution of terrorism, such as: 
(1) The conceptual framework assigns a central role to high growth rate of 
population and structure of population, which is a causal factor neglected by 
certain of the dominant approaches to explain the general causes of terrorism; 
(2) The conceptual framework here is also able to explain how and why 
terrorism thrives in certain environments by linking demographic factors to 
environmental aversion of regions. In particular, the terrorism can be due to high 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 5(1), M. Coccia, p.84-104. 
96 
96 
growth rates of population that can generate cultural deviance, frustration and 
anger of young individuals; 
(4) Societies with low growth rates of population, high standard of living, 
quality of life and multiple opportunities for advancement of young generations are 
not likely to produce terrorism.  
(5) One future scenario, based on this study, might be that current trend of 
high growth rates of population in selected societies (and communities) can 
continue to feed terrorism and terroristic threat for many years to come. 
Since terrorism arises out of an inability to cope effectively with aversive 
environments, there is a clear need to focus on a long-run strategy of diplomacy 
and carefully economic aid for a conflict dissolution of this critical problem in 
society: ‚means to redesign either the society that has the problem or its 
environment in such way as to eliminate the problems or the conditions that caused 
it‛ (Ackoff & Rovin, 2003)2 Currently, the war against terrorism has short-term 
objectives, such as to reduce the incidence of terrorism by deterrence policy, 
imposing sanctions on actual and presumptive terrorist countries, cut off their 
financing, etc. Ackoff & Rovin (2003) argue that: ‚containment and isolation of 
terrorists have not been particularly effective because they do not weaken the 
terrorists’ beliefs …sanctions imposed on such societies do not reduce their 
resolve‛. The preventive actions3 to neutralize or incapacitate terrorists in the 
presence of effective and/or potential threats  also raise serious issues. Other 
counter-terrorism strategies remove regimes that sponsor terrorists and/or apply 
military actions. However, ‚military means to preempt the terrorists or root them 
out can reduce, but not eliminate, the terrorist threat. Indeed, it may actually 
increase it by radicalizing many young and destabilizing moderate secular Muslim 
governments‛ (Linstone, 2003). In effect, these strategies may actually induce 
terrorism and trigger the criminal activity of non-state organizations of terrorism 
(cf. Editorials Nature, 2015)4.  
Considering the problematic demographic and socioeconomic factors of the 
Middle East discussed here, a policy of conflict resolution to reduce the terrorism 
from nations that are its principal sources requires a program of economic aid to 
eliminate inequality of quality of life, standard of living, and opportunities in 
society (cf. Ehrlich & Liu, 2002; Ackoff & Rovin, 2003; Frey et al., 2003; Coccia, 
2012d). The aim is to provide education and economic opportunity for the young 
population to contrast the anti-modernization advocated by the fundamentalists (cf. 
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010). This political economy can support wealth, wellbeing 
and goal-seeking behavior of people in populated regions and can reduce 
environmental aversion and, likely, one of principal sources of terrorism (cf., 
Agnew, 1985, Rice, 2009). Hence, the rising economic prosperity of certain 
environments would effectively counter the fundamentalist drive and, in the long 
 
2 For Ackoff & Rovin (2003, p. 9, original Italics and emphasis) ‚problems can be treated in four 
different ways - absolution, resolution, solution and dissolution -and these form a hierarchy, 
meaning that each is less effective, in general, than the one that follows it. Absolution means to 
ignore a problem and hope it will solve itself...Resolution means to employ behaviour used in 
similar situations, adapted if necessary, so as to obtain an outcome that is good enough … it is the 
approach to problems most commonly used by those who govern and those who manage public 
processes....Solution, means to discover or create behaviour that yield the best, or approximately the 
best, possible outcome, one that ‚optimizes.‛ Problem solving usually involves research, often 
using experimentation, quantitative analysis, and uncommon sense.  Moreover, solutions generally 
do not exist in isolation from other problems. Solutions obtained to problems isolated from the 
other problems with which they interact generally produce one or more new problems ...Dissolution 
[see above in the text]. 
3 Preventive action differs from pre-emptive action:  the latter is a response to a clearly impending 
strike, whereas the former is a response to an attack feared at some time in the future (e.g., pinpoint 
military strikes, isolation of crazy states by diplomatic action, support of moderate religious 
opposition groups and Muslim communities for the purpose of counter-radicalization and counter-
terrorism, cf. Linstone, 2003). 
4 For instance, Haushofer et al., (2010) argue that: ‚Israeli military actions against Palestinians lead 
to escalation rather than incapacitation‛. 
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run, may help to lower the fertility rates and related causes of terrorism in society. 
In fact, Krieger & Meierrieks (2010, p. 902) confirm that social policies ameliorate 
poor short-run and long-run socioeconomic conditions of population (e.g., 
unemployment, poverty, inequality, and dissatisfaction), and indirectly reduce 
terrorism. In short, domestic, transnational and international terrorism may also be 
fought by higher social spending in developmental programs and more generous 
welfare regimes in aversive environments with high growth rates of population and 
socioeconomic problems. As a matter of fact, these developmental programs, to 
support education and economic opportunity in selected societies, can help to raise 
economic prosperity and human development. The socio-economic progress and 
high wellbeing may help both to lower short-run sources of collective deviance and 
frustration in society, and to lower fertility rates, inequality and poverty that set the 
long-run stage for terrorism.  
Terrorism is expected to increase in the future, though investment in R&D and 
research labs, technology transfer, improved enforcement technologies and possible 
rising economic growth. Possible reasons can be also due to other factors such as 
the possible increase of income inequality, population growth, public debt, 
recessions and economic turmoil, migration flows, global warming, socioeconomic 
tensions in geo-economic areas, etc. (cf., Coccia, 2004, 2005, 2005a, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009, 2009c, 2009d, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 
2010d, 2011, 2012d, 2013a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017, 2017a)5.  
Overall, then, terrorism is due to manifold and complex factors, mainly linked to 
the question of what human beings truly need and how they seek to address and 
satisfy real needs. The findings of the study here, although they are contest-
dependent over time and space, can clarify whenever possible, one of principal 
sources of terrorism and its evolution worldwide. This study does not focus on 
causes of specific attacks of individual terrorists in Western countries that can be 
due to personal frustration, imitative behavior and other socioeconomic – 
psychological factors that deserve to be investigated in other studies. Moreover, the 
study here to analysis did not permit some intervening variables that may have been 
useful in providing a deeper and richer explanation of these social phenomena of 
interests. To exploring the general implications of this study, future research should 
explore (and measure) how the frustration and alienation of high levels of 
population density and other socioeconomic factors in specific 
societies/communities stimulate cultural deviance, radicalization paths and 
terrorism both in Eastern and in Western countries.  
To conclude, the results of this study are of course tentative, since we know that 
several factors causing terrorism are often not equal over time and space. This 
study here focuses on specific demographic root causes of terrorism that are clearly 
important but not sufficient to understand the comprehensive reasons for and the 
general implications of international terrorism in modern society. 
 
Appendix: Countries  
North America: Canada, Mexico, United States.   
Western Europe: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Gibraltar, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vatican City, Germany.  
 
5 Cf. also Calabrese et al., 2005; Cariola & Coccia, 2004; Cavallo et al., 2014, 2014a, 2015; Coccia, 
2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006, 2006a, 2007, 2008, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 
2009a, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2011, 2012, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2013, 
2013a, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f, 2014g, 2015, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 
2015d, 2016, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2018, Coccia & Bozeman, 
2016; Coccia & Finardi, 2012, 2013; Coccia & Wang, 2015, 2016; Coccia & Cadario, 2014; Coccia 
et al., 2015, 2012, Coccia & Rolfo, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2012, 2007, 2010, 2010, 2013; Coccia & 
Wang, 2015, 2016; Rolfo & Coccia, 2005. 
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Middle East & North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, Yemen.  
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